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ABSTRACT
This paper develops and tests a model of how country characteristics, such as legal protections for
minority investors, and the level of economic and financial development, influence firms' costs and
benefits in implementing measures to improve their own governance and transparency. The model
focuses on an entrepreneur who needs to raise funds to finance the firm's investment opportunities
and who decides whether or not to invest in better firm-level governance mechanisms to reduce
agency costs. We show that, for a given level of country investor protection, the incentives to adopt
better governance mechanisms at the firm level increase with a country's financial and economic
development. When economic and financial development is poor, the incentives to improve firm-
level governance are low because outside finance is expensive and the adoption of better governance
mechanisms is expensive. Using firm-level data on international corporate governance and
transparency ratings for a large sample of firms from around the world, we find evidence consistent
with this prediction. Specifically, we show that (1) almost all of the variation in governance ratings
across firms in less developed countries is attributable to country characteristics rather than firm
characteristics typically used to explain governance choices, (2) firm characteristics explain more
of the variation in governance ratings in more developed countries, and (3) access to global capital
markets sharpens firm incentives for better governance, but decreases the importance of home-
country legal protections of minority investors.
René M. Stulz
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance deals with the mechanisms that ensure that investors in corporations 
get a return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance varies 
widely across countries and across firms. Better governance enables firms to access capital 
markets on better terms, which is valuable for firms intending to raise funds. We would, therefore, 
expect firms that plan to access capital markets – especially those with valuable growth 
opportunities that cannot be financed internally – to adopt mechanisms that commit them to better 
governance. 
With the availability of data on corporate governance and disclosure practices of individual 
companies around the world, provided first by the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR) and, more recently, by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) among others, several studies have investigated whether governance and 
transparency scores are related to firm characteristics, such as investment opportunities, external 
financing needs, asset size, or ownership structure, and to the efficiency of the legal regime in 
protecting minority shareholder interests (Durnev and Kim, 2004; Francis, Khurana, and Pereira, 
2003; Klapper and Love, 2003; Krishnamurty, Sevic, and Sevic, 2003). In general, they find 
supporting evidence that the quality of governance practices is positively related to growth 
opportunities, the concentration of ownership, the need for external financing, and the protection 
of investor rights. However, until now, the importance of other country characteristics, such as 
the financial and economic development of the country in which a company is domiciled, and 
how that importance is affected by financial globalization, has not been investigated. This is 
surprising since a number of studies show that other country characteristics besides measures of 
investor protection have a significant impact on country-level measures of   3
governance.
1 In this paper, we find that firm characteristics, such as investment opportunities, 
asset size, ownership, and cash holdings, explain almost none of the variation in CLSA scores. 
Though firm-specific variables are more successful in explaining variation in S&P scores, their 
explanatory power is dwarfed by the explanatory power of country characteristics.  
Why then do countries matter so much for corporate governance? Countries matter because 
they influence the costs that firms incur to bond themselves to good governance and the benefits 
they receive from doing so.
2 Better governance reduces a firm’s cost of funds only to the extent 
that investors expect the firm to be governed well after the funds have been raised. It is, therefore, 
important for the firm to find ways to commit itself credibly to higher quality governance. 
However, mechanisms to do so may be unavailable or prohibitively expensive in countries with 
poor investor protection and poor economic development. For instance, credible external 
verification of a firm’s income disclosures may not be available because insufficient economic 
development means that the necessary infrastructure for such verification is not available (see 
Ball, 2001; Black, 2001). Consequently, a firm can have potentially valuable growth 
opportunities, yet it takes no steps to have good governance because the tools required are too 
expensive or not even available in its country. Perhaps the most important benefit to a firm from 
having good governance is that it facilitates access to capital markets. But, this benefit is 
worthless if a firm is located in a country with poor financial development. Because of this poor 
development, the firm finds it expensive to raise funds, so that it chooses to raise a smaller 
amount of funds and, hence, benefits less from better governance. As a result, firms with good 
                                                           
1 Bushman and Smith (2003) show that political characteristics are important for some types of disclosure. 
Dyck and Zingales (2003) show that a high level of diffusion of the press is negatively related to benefits of 
control. Finally, Stulz and Williamson (2003) and Hope (2003) find that proxies for cultural heritage and 
religion are related to disclosure.
 
2 Our focus is on why firms in different countries have different governance quality when measured by 
governance indices rather than on why governance systems differ across countries. We take the governance 
system as exogenously given. It affect firms’ corporate governance decisions. There is a large literature that 
contrasts governance systems across countries (see Allen and Gale, 2000). Some of that literature has 
focused on development as a determinant of the financial system (see, for instance, John and Kedia (2003, 
2004), who show theoretically that financial development and the quality of monitoring technologies of a 
country affect the choice of governance mechanisms).      4
growth opportunities may have poor governance because they are in a country where financial 
development and investor protection are poor. In other words, it is not worth it for the firm to take 
steps to bond itself to better governance. 
If a country is poorly developed and protects investors poorly, it will be difficult for firms to 
find ways to commit to good governance and the rights of minority shareholders will be mostly 
determined by the characteristics of the country. Therefore, we expect country characteristics to 
play an overwhelming role as a determinant of governance in poorly developed countries. At the 
same time, we would expect that financial globalization should reduce the importance of the 
country determinants of governance and increase firm-level incentives for good governance in 
two ways. First, firms that have access to foreign capital markets and financial institutions are 
less dependent on the development of their country. As a result, firms from poorly developed 
countries find it easier to obtain capital and, therefore, have greater incentives to adopt good 
governance. Second, financial globalization enables firms to “borrow” the investor protection of 
countries where protection is high. For instance, firms can list their shares for trading in the U.S. 
by initiating an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) program. A number of researchers have 
argued that this action subjects or “bonds” the firms to U.S. securities laws (see Coffee, 1999, 
2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Doidge, 2004; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; and Stulz, 
1999). Though there are limits to the extent to which securities laws can be enforced on foreign 
firms (see Black, 2001; Licht, 2003; Siegel, 2004), there may well be no substitute mechanisms 
for firms from some countries to credibly bond themselves to good governance (see Ball, 2001, 
and Perino, 2003). 
If it were costless for firms to adopt good governance mechanisms, regardless of the 
standards in the home country, then all firms would do so when they access capital markets for 
the first time (unless, of course, the firm’s owners value control and discretion for non-pecuniary 
reasons). Hence, even though countries would protect investor rights differently, there would be 
no differences across countries in the degree to which investors are expropriated by controlling   5
shareholders. Therefore, differences in the costs and benefits from implementing good 
governance mechanisms must be taken into account to explain why their adoption differs across 
countries. We construct a model where countries differ not only in how they protect investors but 
also in the cost of accessing capital markets and in the cost of implementing firm-level 
governance mechanisms. This model enables us to analyze the determinants of governance in a 
richer setting than previous models. If it is costlier to implement good firm-level governance and 
to raise funds in countries with low development, firms in such countries can find the benefit 
from good firm-level governance to be too small to justify the cost. Since investor protection is 
generally poor in countries with low development, firm-level governance may be infeasible 
precisely when it is needed most. 
In our empirical work, we test the model’s predictions using the CLSA corporate governance 
ratings and the S&P transparency and disclosure ratings. These ratings measure both firm-level 
governance attributes adopted by firms and attributes imposed on firms through legislation and 
regulation. We show that almost 39% of the variance for CLSA ratings and 73% of the variance 
for the S&P scores can be explained by country-level dummy variables. Adding firm-specific 
variables does not increase the explained variation for developing countries, so these variables 
explain none of the variation in governance for these countries. The same firm-specific variables 
explain roughly 8% of the variation in transparency scores for developed countries, so that 
governance is better explained by firm characteristics in these countries. Our preferred 
interpretation of the results is that countries matter more than firm characteristics. Of course, it is 
not the only possible explanation since our various specifications do not explain all of the cross-
sectional variation in ratings. We discuss alternate interpretations and explain why we believe that 
the results are consistent with our preferred interpretation.  
In this paper, we use a broader sample of firms for the S&P ratings than that used in earlier 
papers. As a result, we are able to estimate regressions separately for developed and developing 
countries, which is not possible for CLSA since almost all countries included in that sample are   6
countries with GNP per capita below the median of the countries in the S&P sample. We find that 
firm-specific variables are more informative about firm-level governance for firms from more 
developed countries, which is consistent with the key prediction of our model. In particular, firm 
characteristics are not significant in explaining the S&P ratings in the countries with low 
development, but they are significant in countries with high development. Though splitting the 
sample according to economic development identifies a significant difference in how firm 
characteristics are correlated with governance, the same result does not obtain when we split the 
sample according to a measure of investor protection. For instance, the investor-protection 
variable used by Durnev and Kim (2004) is constructed in such a way that some countries with a 
low value for that variable are extremely prosperous. These are countries where the anti-director 
index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) has an extremely low value. 
Interestingly, in these countries, firm characteristics do matter for governance. 
We then investigate whether financial globalization enables firms to partly escape the country 
determinants of governance and thereby sharpens the incentives for firms with growth 
opportunities to have good governance. In support of our hypothesis, firm characteristics are 
jointly significant for firms with New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ traded (“Level 
2 or 3”) ADR programs from low development countries, but they are not for purely local firms. 
Further, country-level investor protection is not a significant determinant of corporate governance 
for global firms in developed countries. Less supportive of our hypothesis is the result that adding 
firm characteristics to a regression that controls for country effects through dummy variables does 
not increase the adjusted R-squared differently for global firms than for non-global firms.  
There is a related but distinct literature on the impact of globalization on governance. We 
distinguish between investor protection from the state and investor protection chosen by the firm 
to improve on the investor protection granted by the state, which we call “firm-level governance.” 
In this paper, we focus on firm-level governance. The literature demonstrates that globalization 
has an impact on the investor protection granted by the state. For instance, as shown by   7
Smarzynska and Wei (2000) and Bonaglia, de Macedo, and Bussolo (2001), countries that are 
more open have less corruption, so that governance and openness are related. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we examine the choice of firm-level governance 
mechanisms in a model in which the cost of implementing these mechanisms and the cost of 
access to capital markets depend on the country in which a firm is located. In Section 3, we 
present our sample of firms and governance ratings. We demonstrate the paramount importance 
of country-specific factors and the limited importance of firm-specific factors as explanatory 
variables for the corporate governance ratings in Section 4. We also show that firm-specific 
factors are more important in more developed countries. In Section 5, we provide evidence that 
globalization makes the governance of firms less dependent on country-specific characteristics 
and more dependent on firm-specific characteristics. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. A model of choice of governance attributes by firms and financial globalization 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) show that most firms outside the U.S. are 
controlled by large shareholders. Large shareholders can extract private benefits from control of 
the corporation. A number of recent papers model the extraction of private benefits from the firm 
by controlling shareholders (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman, 2000; Lombardo and 
Pagano, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2004; 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004). These models assume 
either that the extraction of private benefits is costly to the firm, or that it is costly to the 
controlling shareholder. Regardless of the approach taken, they establish that controlling 
shareholders consume fewer private benefits in countries where the cost of extracting private 
benefits is higher. 
The deadweight costs associated with the extraction of private benefits increase the cost of 
outside funds for the controlling shareholders. As a result, controlling shareholders for which 
access to capital markets is important have incentives to find ways to commit to expropriate   8
fewer private benefits. The literature has shown that by increasing their ownership of cash flow 
rights, controlling shareholders make the extraction of private benefits more costly because they 
pay for more of these private benefits out of the shares they own. As the extraction of private 
benefits becomes more costly, it becomes optimal for controlling shareholders to consume fewer 
such benefits. Firms can also make extraction of private benefits more costly through better 
governance. For instance, by increasing the firm’s transparency, controlling shareholders make it 
easier for outsiders to measure their consumption of private benefits and to take actions to reduce 
it. In this paper, we allow for a role for corporate governance. 
We assume that there is a cost to improving governance. For instance, greater transparency 
could increase political pressures on the firm and lead to expropriation from the state (see Leuz 
and Oberholzer-Gee, 2003); having independent directors could be time-consuming for 
management and controlling shareholders and might reduce their discretion over the firm’s 
investment policy. There is considerable skepticism in the literature that credible mechanisms, 
whereby the controlling shareholders commit to consume fewer private benefits, can even be 
adopted in countries with the worst protection of minority shareholders. In other words, in these 
countries, the cost of such mechanisms might be prohibitive.
3  The reward to a controlling 
shareholder from committing to better governance is that he reduces the deadweight costs 
associated with the consumption of private benefits when he raises funds in public markets. It is 
generally assumed in the literature that these deadweight costs increase with the amount of funds 
raised. Consequently, the reward to better governance for the controlling shareholder is small if 
the extent to which he can access the capital markets is limited because of poor financial 
development and if the costs from committing to less expropriation are high. 
Like Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), we consider the problem of an entrepreneur who has to 
raise funds to finance an investment opportunity. This entrepreneur has control of the firm, so that 
he is the controlling shareholder. We assume that he controls the firm regardless of the fraction of 
                                                           
3 See Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001).   9
cash flow rights he owns. The key difference between our model and theirs is that we allow the 
firm to improve the investor protection that applies to its shareholders through better governance 
at a cost. We, therefore, focus our presentation on the implications of that difference. We consider 
an entrepreneur with wealth W. This entrepreneur has an investment opportunity available. An 
investment of capital K will return aK
α, the firm’s cash flow before expropriation, where 0 < α < 
1 and where a > 0, after which the firm will pay a liquidating dividend. The diminishing-returns-
to-scale production function is required to insure that the model has a solution when investor 
protection is such that it is optimal for the entrepreneur to expropriate nothing. The entrepreneur 
has to decide the scale of the project. If K > W, the entrepreneur must raise external funds. 
The entrepreneur extracts private benefits after having raised funds and after the cash flow is 
realized. Consequently, when the entrepreneur raises funds, investors form expectations about the 
proportion of the firm’s cash flows that he will expropriate, f. In this model, the entrepreneur pays 
a cost for expropriating shareholders on personal account; in other words, the cost is not 
subtracted from the firm’s cash flows. The cost could represent the expected value of the 
punishment imposed on the controlling shareholder if he is caught expropriating minority 
shareholders, as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), or it could correspond to expenses that the 
entrepreneur incurs for setting up mechanisms through which to extract private benefits. It is 
assumed to be a convex function of f, bf  
2, where b can be a positive constant or a function, and it 
increases linearly with the firm’s investor protection and with the firm’s cash flows. This cost is 
given by: 
2 0.5 ( ) bf aK p q
α +  
The cost of extracting private benefits increases with both firm-level governance and with the 
investor protection granted by the state. The country’s investor protection is equal to p, where a 
higher value of p means greater investor protection. The investor protection that applies to   10
investors in the firm is equal to p + q, where q is the investor protection under the control of the 
firm.  
It seems reasonable to assume that the cost of increasing investor protection at the firm-level 
is not sensitive to firm size but increases with the amount of protection acquired. We assume that 
the marginal cost of firm-level governance is increasing in the quality of firm-level governance, 
so that we choose the functional form for the cost of firm-level governance to be mq
2, where m is 
a positive constant. To take into account differences in financial development across countries, 
we assume that it costs n(K – W) to raise K – W, where n corresponds to a proportional cost of 
raising capital. An improvement in financial development corresponds to a decrease in n, where n 
is a constant between 0 and 1. Though existing models assume that q = 0, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002) have a differential cost of funds between a closed economy and an open economy.
4 In our 
model, the payments n(K – W) and mq
2 reduce the wealth of the entrepreneur dollar-for-dollar 
whether these amounts are paid by him out of his own pocket or through the firm. It simplifies the 
analysis, but does not change anything of substance, if we assume that n(K – W) and mq
2 are paid 
by the entrepreneur out of the liquidating dividend paid to him by the firm. Further, we assume 
until stated otherwise that b is a constant.   
  
The model has no risk, so that shares have to return the risk-free rate. We assume an interest 
rate of zero for simplicity and minority shareholders have unlimited opportunities to earn that rate 
of interest on other investments. Therefore, the minority shareholders acquire a fraction (1 – k) of 
cash flow rights only if their expected dividend, equal to (1 – k)(1 – f)aK
α, is at least equal to their 
initial investment of K – W (this is the minority shareholders’ participation constraint). Since the 
entrepreneur will not give money away to the minority shareholders, it must be that the 
participation constraint of minority shareholders is binding: 
(1 )(1 ) kf a K K W
α −− = −        ( 1 )  
                                                           
4 The exception is Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), where firms can choose to have an ADR program 
which increases investor protection. There is no implementation cost to them, so m = 0. However, the firm 
does not have that choice when it is set up.   11
In this model, the entrepreneur wants to maximize the total cash flows of the firm net of the 
cost of extracting private benefits and of the dividend to be paid to minority shareholders:  
22 ( ) 0.5 ( ) ( ) S aK n K W mq bf aK p q K W
αα =−− −− + − −       (2) 
Equation (2) assumes that the participation constraint of minority shareholders is binding since 
that is the case we focus on. The entrepreneur maximizes (2) by choosing three variables: K, q, 
and f. In maximizing (2), the entrepreneur has to satisfy two constraints. First, he will only invest 
if S is positive (the entrepreneur’s participation constraint). Second, since f is chosen after funds 
have been raised from shareholders, it has to be consistent with maximization of the 
entrepreneur’s welfare at the time that it is chosen (the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility 
constraint).  
In a world of perfect markets, there are no transaction and contracting costs, so n = m = 0. In 
such a world, the entrepreneur would choose contracts that constrain him to select f = 0. If it is 
costless for the firm to choose mechanisms that constrain the entrepreneur from expropriating 
minority shareholders, the entrepreneur has nothing to gain by not using these mechanisms since, 
ultimately, only the entrepreneur pays the deadweight costs of expropriation. If the cost of 
committing to a lower level of expropriation is convex and increasing in the level of commitment, 
as it is in our model, it will never be optimal for the entrepreneur to commit to no expropriation.  
After the entrepreneur has chosen q and K, shares are sold to outside investors for an amount 
equal to K – W. The entrepreneur then owns a fraction k of cash flow rights, given by 1 – (K – 
W)/(1 – f)aK
α, where the denominator of the second term is the firm’s cash flow after 
expropriation, which depends on f. After raising funds, the entrepreneur chooses how much to 
expropriate by maximizing the following expression with respect to f and subject to the constraint 
that f has to be nonnegative and cannot exceed one: 
2 (1 ) 0.5 ( ) k f aK bf aK p q faK
αα α −− + +        ( 3 )    12
The first term of the expression corresponds to the dividends received by the entrepreneur. The 
second term is the entrepreneur’s cost of extraction of private benefits. Finally, the third term 
represents the private benefits extracted by the entrepreneur. The solution for f when the 









=           ( 4 )  
For given k, the fraction of cash flow expropriated falls as the level of investor protection 
provided by the state, p, increases, as in earlier models. In contrast to earlier models, the 
entrepreneur gets to choose the level of investor protection provided by the firm, q, and he 
extracts private benefits at a lower rate when q is higher. Further, f and k are negatively related, so 
that an entrepreneur with a larger stake in the firm expropriates less. 
Using the participation constraint of minority shareholders, equation (4) can be written as:  
1
(1 ) ( )
KW
f
f aK b p q
α
 −
=  −+ 
        ( 5 )  
Rewriting this equation, we get a quadratic equation in f. The solution for f has to be such that 
f = 0 if it is infinitely costly to expropriate shareholders. With this requirement, there is only one 









aK b p q aK b p q
fo t h e r w i s e
αα
 −−   =− − <    ++   
=
  (6) 
When the entrepreneur chooses q and K, he also picks f, so that f can be written as f (K,q). For a 
given level of K, f falls with q and with the productivity of physical capital.  
When investors invest in the firm, they want to receive back their investment since the 
interest rate is zero. The investment opportunity must be good enough given f and the level of 
investor protection sufficiently high to guarantee this outcome. This means that, as in Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002), there will be investment opportunities for which the entrepreneur will not be   13
able to raise funds. If m is low, the firm can improve cheaply on its country’s investor protection, 
so that some firms, that would not go public if they had to rely on the country’s investor 
protection alone, will choose to do so after spending to improve the firm’s investor protection 
through better governance. In our model, the cost to a firm of improving its governance does not 
depend on its size. Consequently, firms that raise a small amount of outside equity – namely, 
those with poor growth opportunities – will not gain from improving their governance because 
the cost of doing so will be amortized over fewer dollars raised. We therefore expect larger firms 
to have better governance; further, firms have better governance when m is low and when they 
have good investment opportunities. A high n reduces the incentives of firms to improve on 
corporate governance because it reduces the amount of funds raised. If m is high enough, firms do 
not adopt firm-level governance mechanisms that improve on the investor protection granted by 
the state. In contrast, if m is zero, then all firms have the same level of investor protection and 
there is no expropriation. Except for Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), the literature has 
effectively assumed that m is infinite.  
Substituting (6) into (1) and using the minority shareholders’ participation constraint, the 
controlling shareholder maximizes: 
22 () 0 . 5 ( , ) ( ) () S aK n K W mq bf K q aK p q K W
αα =−− −− + − −      (7) 
The nonlinearity of this expression in K and q makes it impossible to obtain closed-form 
solutions for K and q when b is fixed. However, our analysis leads to the following result: 
 
Proposition 1. If m = 0, all firms that raise external funds choose a value of q high 
enough so that f = 0, and the protection of investors by the state is not relevant. As m 
becomes large, q becomes very small, and the protection of investors depends almost 
exclusively on the protection granted by the state, p. As p becomes large and m > 0, q 
becomes very small because firm-level governance mechanisms become redundant but   14
are costly. Finally, for n large enough, q = 0 since the firm does not expect to raise 
external capital. 
 
The important point of this proposition is that a firm’s choice of governance mechanisms depends 
critically on the cost of implementing these mechanisms and on the cost of raising funds. These 
costs are determined partly by a country’s investor protection but also by the country’s economic 
and financial development. It, therefore, necessarily follows that the choice of governance 
mechanisms depends on country characteristics other than investor protection. If investor 
protection is high enough, no expropriation takes place and the adoption of firm-level governance 
mechanisms is not optimal. If development is too low, there is no point to the adoption of such 
mechanisms because firms cannot raise a sufficient amount of funds to make good governance 
pay. Proposition 1 implies the existence of a threshold level of economic development below 
which firms’ incentives for good governance are trivially small and a threshold level of investor 
protection by the state such that, if a country reaches that level, there is little gain for firms to try 
to improve on that level of investor protection on their own account.  
We can obtain additional results using the first-order conditions for K and q. These first-order 
conditions are, respectively, for K and q:  
12 1 1 [(,) 0 . 5(,) ] ( ) K a K n bf K q f aK bf K q a K p q
αα α αα
− − =++ + +   (8a) 
2 2 (,) ( ) 0 . 5 (,) q mq bf f K q aK p q bf K q aK
αα =− + −      ( 8 b )    
where fK is the partial derivative of f (K,q) with respect to K and is positive and fq is the partial 
derivative of f with respect to q, which we already know to be negative. The left-hand side of 
equation (8a) is the marginal revenue from investing an additional dollar in production. The right-
hand side is the marginal cost of the additional dollar raised for the entrepreneur. In perfect 
financial markets, the cost would be $1. With imperfect investor protection and financial markets, 
the additional terms on the right-hand side of the equation are positive, so that the cost of capital   15
is higher than what it would be in perfect markets. As a result, the amount of capital invested is 
lower than that in perfect markets. In equation (8b), the left-hand side is the marginal cost of 
better governance, while the right-hand side is the marginal benefit.  
We can use equation (8b) to study the comparative statics of q treating K as a parameter. In 
this case, q increases with K and a, but falls as m and p increase. The intuition for these results is 
as follows. As K and a increase, cash flow increases. For a constant f, the total amount of 
expropriation increases and expropriation becomes more costly for the entrepreneur. He partly 
offsets this increase in the cost of expropriation by increasing q. As m increases, it becomes more 
costly for the entrepreneur to acquire better governance and he therefore acquires less of it. 
Finally, p and q are substitutes. An increase in p decreases the marginal benefit from better firm-
level investor protection and the entrepreneur decreases the amount of firm-level investor 
protection he acquires. Equation (8b) does not depend on n directly. Though we can derive 
comparative statics using equation (8b) in a straightforward way, we have to use a linear 
approximation of (8a) in q and K to obtain results. Using the linear approximation, equation (8a) 
implies that an increase in n decreases K. It therefore follows from equations (8a) and (8b) that an 
increase in n leads to a decrease in investor protection through its impact on q. With this analysis, 
the entrepreneur purchases more investor protection if the investment opportunity is more 
valuable (higher cash flow before expropriation), if the cost of purchasing investor protection is 
lower, if financial development is higher, and if investor protection guaranteed by the state is 
lower. 
A closed-form solution for S can be obtained for the case where b is equal to B(1 – k), where 
B is a constant. The literature has assumed that the cost of expropriation depends on p but not on 
firm characteristics other than cash flow. The assumption that b is equal to B(1 – k) implies that 
the overall cost of expropriation for the controlling shareholder falls linearly with his ownership 
stake in the firm. The assumption that the cost of expropriation falls as k increases does not seem 
unreasonable. Suppose that the controlling shareholder owns 99.99% of the firm. Presumably, if   16
he has some money and he is caught expropriating, he can always buy out the shareholders who 
own 0.01%. In contrast, if the controlling shareholder owns 40% of the firm and gets caught, 
many more individuals will be affected and pressure on politicians to punish the controlling 
shareholder is likely to be much higher. So, it is reasonable to think that the political system is 
likely to punish more severely the controlling shareholder who owns 40% of the shares than the 
one who owns 99.99%. A controlling shareholder who owns 40% of the shares and expropriates 
10% of the cash flow of the company is also more likely to get caught than one who owns 
99.99% and who expropriates the same fraction of the cash flows because the shareholders who 
get expropriated lose a much larger dollar amount in the former case than in the latter. 
With this assumption, we can replace b in equation (3) with B(1 – k), so that f  now equals 
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Replacing f by 1/B(p + q) and b by B(1 – k) in equation (7), where k is defined by equation (10), 
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The entrepreneur maximizes S by choosing q and K. In this case, if the entrepreneur raises 
funds, he chooses K to be given by:   17
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There are four important comparative statics for K in equation (12):  
1) An increase in a increases K. An increase in a means that the investment opportunity 
of the entrepreneur is better, so that the marginal product of capital increases and he 
invests more. 
2) An increase in n decreases K. If n is high, as in poorly developed financial markets, it 
is more expensive to raise funds, so that the entrepreneur raises a smaller amount of 
funds and invests less. 
3) An increase in investor protection from the firm, q, is associated with an increase in K 
because expropriation falls. 
4) An increase in investor protection from the state, p, is associated with an increase in K 
since the entrepreneur expropriates less. 
 
In equation (12), K depends on q. We can substitute equation (12) in the first-order condition 
for q. This yields a polynomial in q. The comparative statics are straightforward to evaluate when 
S is a concave function of q, which has to be the case for an interior solution for q to exist. 
Consequently, we obtain the following result: 
 
Proposition 2. Provided that there is an interior solution for q and the entrepreneur raises 
outside equity, a lower q is chosen, or in other words, the firm adopts fewer restraints on 
the expropriation of investors, as: 
  P1. The cost of adopting these restraints, m, increases; 
  P2. The protection of investor rights through the state, p, increases;    18
  P3. The cost of accessing capital markets, n, increases; 
  P4. The investment opportunities of the firm, a, worsen. 
 
Note that Proposition 2 has the same results as those obtained earlier when evaluating the 
first-order conditions (8a) and (8b) and using a linear approximation in the comparative static 
analysis. The intuition for the results is the same as the one given then.  
If we view Ω = p + q as the measure of investor protection that takes into account the 
protection granted by the state, p, and the additional protection granted by the firm, q, Ω increases 
with p, falls with m, increases with a, and falls with n. The impact of an increase in p on Ω is less 
if m is low because p and q are closer substitutes. 
Our model provides a richer and, we believe, more realistic analysis of the determinants of 
corporate governance at the firm level. With this model, bad institutions and low levels of 
economic and financial development limit the incentives of firms to improve corporate 
governance on their own. Firms sell shares to the public in countries that differ strongly in the 
degree of protection of investor rights and in the level of economic development. Though existing 
models focus on the protection of investor rights, the extent to which firms improve corporate 
governance depends critically on the development of capital markets. To see this, suppose that 
capital markets differ across countries in the extent to which they can absorb equity issues. In 
other words, firms in a country with poorly developed markets are constrained in issuing equity 
while firms in countries with well-developed markets are not. In our model, this is equivalent to 
making n a step function, so that, beyond a given level of capital raising activity, n is large 
enough to prevent more capital raising activity. Among constrained firms, the benefit of 
improving governance is limited since doing so does not enable them to raise more funds. 
Suppose now, however, that a constrained firm gains access to global markets. In this case, it   19
becomes more valuable for the firm to improve governance because it can raise more funds as a 
result of doing so. 
We have considered a firm at inception. We assumed that the exogenous variables are given 
and are non-stochastic. Since the solutions for q and K depend non-linearly on the exogenous 
variables, making these variables stochastic would complicate the problem considerably. 
Suppose, however, that a firm has chosen q and K, has sold equity, and unexpectedly faces a 
change in one of the exogenous variables. In this case, any improvement in firm-level governance 
has an additional cost, which is that it creates a wealth transfer from the controlling shareholder to 
the other investors in the firm. For constant α, the firm will not move to the level of firm-level 
governance it would have chosen at its inception with that level of the exogenous variable. 
Therefore, if a unexpectedly increases, so that it would be optimal to expand production, improve 
firm-level governance, and raise more funds, the firm will do some of that if m and n are not too 
high. But the extent to which it changes firm-level governance will be limited by the 
redistribution cost. More generally, we have the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. Provided that m and n are not too large, firm-level governance improves 
following an unexpected decrease in p, an unexpected decrease in n, an unexpected 
decrease in m, and an unexpected increase in a keeping α constant.  
 
With this result, we expect globalization to reduce n by opening up new capital markets for 
firms and creating more competition in the financial intermediation industry. It should also reduce 
m by enabling firms to access new contracting technologies and by expanding the range of 
financial services accessible to firms. Hence, from this perspective, we would expect financial 
globalization to lead to an increase in q for firms that would benefit from financial globalization. 
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3. Data 
We want to explain firm-level choices of corporate governance. For that purpose, we use the 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) corporate 
governance and transparency ratings. The CLSA ratings cover emerging countries and newly-
emerged countries. The S&P ratings cover both developed and emerging economies. Both ratings 
evaluate many objective and some subjective indicators of firm governance practices, including 
categories related to managerial incentives, timely and accurate disclosures, board independence, 
board accountability, enforcement and management accountability, minority shareholder 
protection and social responsibility. While the S&P ratings leave relatively little room for 
subjectivity compared to the CLSA rating, subjectivity is also limited in the CLSA rating. 
Our sample construction begins with the list of firms included in the two ratings systems. The 
CLSA survey was conducted in 2001 and it rates the corporate governance practices of 495 firms 
from 25 countries.
5 This survey has been used in a number of recent papers (for instance, Chen, 
Chen, and Wei, 2003; Palepu, Khanna, and Kogan, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2004; Klapper and 
Love, 2003; and Krishnamurty, Sevic, and Sevic, 2003). The main criterion for including firms in 
the CLSA survey is firm size and investor interest. The CLSA corporate governance rating is 
based on a questionnaire given to financial analysts who responded with “Yes” or “No” answers 
to 57 questions related to seven categories: management discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility. A composite governance rating 
is computed by giving an equal weight of 15% to the first six categories and a weight of 10% to 
social responsibility. Percentage scores on the composite governance ratings range from 13.9 to 
93.5. We do not include financial firms both because they are often subject to regulations and 
laws that other firms are not and because financial ratios have a different meaning for them. After 
removing financial firms, there are 376 firms in the CLSA sample. 
                                                           
5 See Amar Gill, 2001, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: 
Saints and Sinners, Who's Got Religion? Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2002) provide an evaluation of the 
quality of the CLSA data set.   21
In addition to the CLSA survey, we use transparency and disclosure ratings provided by 
Standard and Poor’s.
6 The Standard and Poor’s ratings have also been used in recent research 
(Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan, 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2004). The sample provided to us by 
Standard and Poor’s in April 2003 covers 901 firms from 40 countries. S&P compiles the ratings 
by examining firms’ annual reports and standard regulatory filings for disclosure of 98 items, 
divided into three sections: financial transparency and information disclosure (35 items), board 
and management structure and process (35 items), and ownership structure and investor relations 
(28 items). S&P uses a binary scoring system in which one point is awarded if a particular item is 
disclosed. The scores are added and converted to a percentage score, with scores ranging from 
15.22 to 88.78. After removing financial firms, there are 711 firms from 39 countries. 
Table 1 describes the sample constructed from the two surveys. It is immediately apparent 
that S&P covers many more countries than CLSA. Further, the number of firms covered within a 
country differs sharply across countries. In some countries, like Argentina for CLSA and New 
Zealand for S&P, only one firm is covered. We, therefore, check if all of our results reported 
below differ if we include all countries covered by a survey or if we include only countries for 
which at least five firms are rated. We find that including only countries for which five firms are 
rated makes little difference. It is also clear that there is substantial variation in ratings within 
countries as well as across countries. For CLSA, the lowest-rated country is Indonesia with an 
average score of 37.06, with scores ranging from 13.90 to 64.90, and the highest-rated country is 
South Africa with an average score of 68.38, with scores ranging from 45.00 to 82.60. For S&P, 
the lowest-rated country is Colombia (one firm with a score of 19.15) and the highest-rated is 
Finland (average score of 75.70). We also give information in the table on the number of firms in 
each sample that have a Level 2 or 3 ADR program. Firms with Level 2 or 3 ADRs are firms 
listed either on the NYSE/AMEX or on NASDAQ. Level 3 ADR firms have also raised equity in 
                                                           
6 See Patel, Balic, and Bwakira (2002) for a description of the S&P measure. Bushee (2003) provides an 
extensive discussion of the properties of the S&P ratings.   22
the U.S.
7 To determine if a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange, we use information obtained from 
the Bank of New York, Citibank, the NYSE, and NASDAQ. Listing dates are verified using 
Lexis-Nexis searches and by examining 20-Fs filed with the SEC and firm’s annual reports.  
To test our hypotheses, we require data on firm and country characteristics. Firm-level data 
for sales growth, total assets, ownership, cash holdings, and SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) codes are from Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database. Sales growth is 
measured as the two-year geometric average of annual inflation-adjusted growth in sales from 
1998-2000. Sales growth is winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles to reduce the impact of 
outliers. Total assets, for the year 2000, are measured in millions of U.S. dollars. Ownership is the 
data item reported as “Closely-held shares” for the year 2000. Worldscope defines closely-held 
shares as shares held by insiders, which include senior corporate officers and directors, and their 
immediate families, shares held in trusts, shares held by another corporation (except shares held 
in a fiduciary capacity by financial institutions), shares held by pension/benefit plans, and shares 
held by individuals who hold five percent or more of shares outstanding. In Japan, closely-held 
shares represent the holdings of the ten largest shareholders. For firms with more than one class 
of shares, closely-held shares for each class are added together. The ownership measure is far 
from perfect since it relies on information disclosed by firms and this disclosure is often 
voluntary and unmonitored. Cash holdings correspond to liquid assets held by firms and are 
normalized by total assets.  
Sales growth is a widely used proxy for growth opportunities (see, for instance, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002). The difficulty with sales growth is that it is 
affected by a country’s institutions and business conditions. As an alternative measure of growth 
opportunities that does not suffer from that problem, we also use a measure of dependence on 
external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) defined as capital expenditures minus cash flows 
from operations divided by capital expenditures. This latter variable for these non-U.S. firms is 
                                                           
7 See Table 1 of Foerster and Karolyi (1999) for more details on types of ADR listings.   23
computed using data on capital expenditures and cash flows for firms from the same industry in 
the U.S. The motivation for this approach is that, assuming that growth opportunities of firms in 
the same industry have a significant common component across countries, the level of external 
financing of U.S. firms is the level that firms in other countries would have if they were not 
constrained by the poor development of the country in which they are located. Francis, Khurana, 
and Pereira (2003) use this measure to explain CIFAR disclosure scores and find that the 1991-
1993 scores are positively related to the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure. We do not 
use the original measure because the CLSA and S&P scores are for the early 2000s and the 
original Rajan and Zingales (1998) estimates are for the 1980s. We match U.S. and non-U.S. 
firms by industry at the three-digit SIC code level. Data for this measure is obtained for all U.S. 
firms included in S&P’s Compustat database from 1995-2000. For each firm, the use of external 
finance is summed from 1995-2000 and it is divided by the firm’s total capital expenditures from 
1995 to 2000. At the three-digit SIC code level, we take the industry median. Sample firms with 
the same three-digit SIC are assigned the industry median value. 
Finally, we use a number of country-level variables in our analysis. The indices of anti-
director rights, rule of law, and risk of expropriation are measures of shareholder rights, 
enforcement, and property rights obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(LLSV, 1998). These variables are not available for China, Hungary, Poland, or Russia in the 
LLSV study. Values for anti-director rights and rule of law for these countries are taken from 
Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000). However, the index of the risk of expropriation is not available 
in their study. We follow Durnev and Kim (2004) and define “Legal” as the product of anti-
director and rule of law. Stock market capitalization divided by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is 
from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2001) and Gross National Product (GNP) per capita is 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
The surveys create two selection biases. The first bias is related to country coverage. Less-
developed countries and those in which financial and legal institutions are especially poor will not   24
be represented in the survey because they will not have firms in which the survey-sponsoring 
organizations would have any interest. In these countries, firms will not have been able to 
overcome country characteristics to draw interest from the survey-sponsoring organizations. This 
bias leads us to understate the potential importance of country characteristics. 
The second bias is related to company coverage within countries. Only a subset of firms is 
rated in each country. To investigate this bias, we collected data on almost 15,000 non-financial 
firms available on Worldscope that are in countries covered by the surveys. We then estimated 
logit regression models to predict which firms have a CLSA rating and which firms have an S&P 
rating. In the logit regressions, the dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm is in the 
CLSA or S&P samples and the explanatory variables are the firm characteristics that we 
subsequently use to explain the ratings in our empirical work. The results are presented in the 
Appendix. It is interesting to note the similarities and differences in the firm coverage for the two 
samples. In both logit regressions, firm size is significant with a positive coefficient. However, 
inside ownership has a positive and significant coefficient in the CLSA rating regression and, by 
contrast, a negative and significant coefficient in the S&P rating regression. Finally, the ratio of 
cash holdings to total assets has a positive significant coefficient in the S&P rating regression and 
firm sales growth has a positive and significant coefficient in the CLSA regression. The 
explanatory power of these two models differs dramatically. Firm characteristics explain 
proportionally much less of the selection process by CLSA (pseudo R
2 of 13.15%) than of the 
selection process by S&P (pseudo R
2 of 44.51%). It is clear from this that larger firms are more 
likely to have a rating. Our theory shows that larger firms may have more incentives to adopt 
good governance. If that is the case, our study may understate the importance of firm 
characteristics because the firms in the CLSA and S&P sample are more homogeneous than the 
population of firms. 
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4. How important are country and firm characteristics for governance ratings? 
In this section, we evaluate the importance of country and firm characteristics in explaining 
firm-level governance choices. We first regress the governance ratings on firm characteristics. 
The governance ratings combine investor protection granted by the state and investor protection 
chosen by firms beyond the requirements of the state. Using the notation of the model, the 
governance ratings are proxies for p + q. Our theory is about q. We assume that the part of the 
rating corresponding to investor protection granted by the state is uniform across firms, so that it 
does not depend on firm characteristics. If we find that the rating does depend on firm 
characteristics, we assume it is because these characteristics influence the firm’s choice of firm-
level governance.  
The analysis of Section 2 predicts that firms with a greater demand for external finance are 
firms that will adopt more constraining governance practices. We, therefore, add sales growth to 
the regression since it is a measure of investment opportunities that has been frequently used in 
the literature. Existing papers show that sales growth is significant in explaining the CLSA 
ratings in regressions that control for firm characteristics and investor protection (Durnev and 
Kim, 2004; Klapper and Love, 2003). In addition, we include the Rajan and Zingales measure of 
dependence on external finance as an alternative measure of growth opportunities. 
We also use firm size as a firm characteristic. Our model assumes that the cost of good 
governance is a fixed cost but the benefit is amortized over all of a firm’s security issues. We, 
therefore, expect that large firms are more likely to adopt such practices. However, it is also 
possible that large firms face a greater cost of transparency. This could arise because large firms 
may benefit more from connections to the political authorities than other firms, which may lead 
them to seek less transparency to hide these benefits, or because they may be more likely to be 
expropriated by the state (see Zimmerman, 1983).  
Ownership by the controlling shareholders affects the choice of governance practices at the 
firm level. There is a subtle distinction, however, between the impact of ownership on the firm’s   26
level of expropriation of minority shareholders and on the governance practices adopted by the 
firm. In existing models, greater concentration of ownership leads to less expropriation because 
the controlling shareholder expropriates more from himself as his stake increases, so that the 
payoff from expropriation falls. This result holds even if the controlling shareholder does not take 
actions at the firm level to reduce his ability to expropriate shareholders, so that it has nothing to 
do with the firm or the governance mechanisms of the firm. Our model is focused on the choice 
of governance mechanisms by the firm. As the controlling shareholder owns more shares, we 
would expect him to invest less in firm-level governance mechanisms if those are costly because 
his incentives to expropriate are lower. This makes it difficult to make predictions about how 
ownership and governance scores are related. To the extent that CLSA partly measures the extent 
of expropriation, ownership could be positively related to the score. It seems less likely that the 
S&P scores measure expropriation and more likely that they reflect the adoption of firm-specific 
governance mechanisms. We would, therefore, expect a negative relation between S&P scores 
and ownership. 
Finally, we employ a variable that computes the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. We 
would expect firms with more cash to be less likely to access the capital markets. Consequently, 
we would expect a negative relation between cash holdings and governance. However, firms that 
have just accessed the capital markets may also have higher cash holdings, and these firms should 
also have better governance ratings. Further, cash holdings may also proxy for growth 
opportunities, in which case we would also expect them to be positively associated with 
governance. 
Panel a of Table 2 reports the regression estimates for the CLSA ratings. Model (1) shows the 
regression of governance ratings on firm characteristics. Two firm characteristics, sales growth 
and the cash-to-assets ratio, are significant and both with a positive coefficient. In all 
specifications, we report an F-statistic for a test of the joint significance of all firm and/or country 
variables. In Table 2, these F-statistics for firm-level variables are always significant at the 1%   27
level. The adjusted R
2 from an OLS regression is 4.24%. The t-statistics and F-statistics are 
reported from a regression that takes into account the potential clustering of the error terms within 
countries.
8 In the next specification (2), we investigate the role of country characteristics. We use 
country variables used in the literature before, namely the “Legal” variable used by Durnev and 
Kim (2004), the log of GNP per capita, and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. We 
see that these country variables explain much more of the variation in ratings than firm-specific 
characteristics. Legal and GNP per capita are extremely highly correlated, but Legal has a 
significant positive coefficient while the other two country characteristics are insignificant. In the 
next specification, we regress the ratings on both sets of country characteristics and firm-specific 
characteristics. The adjusted R
2 increases and the F-statistics indicate that both firm and country 
characteristics are both jointly significant. All the variables that were significant in models (1) 
and (2) remain significant. 
In model (4), we estimate a statistical upper-bound on the importance of country-specific 
characteristics by regressing the governance ratings on country dummy variables. We see that the 
adjusted R
2 of that regression is about two and a half times the adjusted R
2 of model (2). This 
indicates that variables that researchers have focused on capture only a fraction of the country 
characteristics that can potentially influence governance scores. Comparing model (4) to model 
(1), we see that the adjusted R
2 of the country dummy regression is nine times that of the 
regression with firm-specific variables. Consequently, the country characteristics dominate firm 
characteristics in explaining the variation in firm governance ratings. In model (5), we estimate 
(1) but with country dummies. The improvement in adjusted R
2 obtained by adding firm-specific 
variables to (5) is trivial. Further, sales growth is no longer significant. In other words, part of the 
                                                           
8  A model using country random effects would also correct for within-country correlation. However, 
Hausman tests indicate that the assumptions of the model are not met and that the random effects estimator 
is not valid. Therefore, we use OLS regressions with clustered robust standard errors to account for within 
country correlation of the error terms – observations within a country are not treated as independent, but 
observations across countries are. The clustered standard errors are similar to heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors (White, 1980) except that the weights are sums over each country (cluster). See Rogers 
(1993) and Williams (2000) for further details. 
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success of sales growth seems to be explained by its correlation with country characteristics. The 
only firm-specific variable that is significant is the cash-to-assets ratio, with a coefficient of 11.51 
and a t-statistic of 2.15.  
We turn next to the S&P governance ratings. The results are reported in Panel b of Table 2. It 
is immediately striking that firm characteristics explain much more of the variation in the S&P 
ratings than they do of the variation in the CLSA ratings. Model (1) regresses the S&P ratings on 
firm-specific characteristics. The adjusted R
2 is 22.49%, which is more than five times the 
adjusted R
2 of the same regression for the CLSA rating. Surprisingly, sales growth is not 
significant but the measure of dependence on external finance is and with a positive coefficient. 
As in Panel a, the cash-to-assets ratio has a positive and significant coefficient. Further, firm size 
is also significant. In the regression with country characteristics, Legal is not significant but the 
log of GNP per capita is. The adjusted R
2 is roughly twice the adjusted R
2 for the comparable 
regression in Panel a. Model (3) adds the set of firm characteristics to model (2). The only 
significant variables in that regression are the measure of dependence on external finance and 
firm size. None of the country characteristics are significant, though the F-statistic associated 
with the joint test that they equal zero is rejected (F-statistic of 4.60). As in Panel a, country 
characteristics capture much less of the variation in governance ratings than country dummy 
variables. We find in model (4) that the R
2 using country dummy variables is 73% – more than 
twice the R
2 using country characteristics. Finally, when we combine firm characteristics with 
country dummies in model (5), the adjusted R
2 increases by a relatively small amount. Again, 
only the dependence on external finance and firm size are significant.   
It follows from the regressions in Table 2 that firm-specific characteristics have very little 
explanatory power for the CLSA ratings and only some explanatory power for the S&P ratings. 
Irrespective of the rating system, country characteristics explain more of the variation in ratings 
than firm characteristics. The greater importance of country characteristics is most obvious when   29
we use country dummy variables. The country characteristics used in the literature capture only a 
fraction of the variation in ratings due to country effects.  
Our model predicts that firm characteristics matter more as development increases, up to a 
point. We next investigate whether firm characteristics explain more of the variation in the ratings 
for developed countries relative to less developed countries. A comparison of developed and less 
developed countries is more meaningful for the S&P ratings. We therefore restrict our analysis to 
these ratings. Table 3 presents the results. 
Panel a of Table 3 splits the sample of the countries for which S&P ratings are available into 
highly developed and less developed countries. We do this by splitting the countries into 
countries with above-median GDP per capita, the highly developed countries, and below-median 
GDP per capita, the less developed countries. The results are striking. First, when we regress the 
ratings on firm characteristics, the adjusted R
2 is 15.54% for the highly developed countries and 
2.19% for the less developed countries. None of the firm characteristics are significant in 
explaining the ratings of the less developed countries. The F-statistic of 13.40 is significant for 
the highly developed countries, but not for the less developed countries (F-statistic of 0.81). In the 
highly developed countries, the rating increases with dependence on external finance, falls with 
ownership concentration, and increases with firm size as predicted by our model. Country 
dummies explain 51.72% of the variation in ratings for the highly developed countries and 
48.12% for the less developed countries. Adding the firm characteristics to the regression with 
only country dummies increases the adjusted R
2 from 51.72% to 59.81% for highly developed 
countries and decreases from 48.12% to 48.00% for the other countries. The F-statistic of the 
joint test of the firm-level variables is significant for the highly developed countries (F-statistic of 
7.25) and insignificant for the less-developed countries (F-statistic of 1.60) This finding confirms 
that firm characteristics are not useful to understand governance ratings in countries with low 
economic development and are more useful to understand these ratings in countries with high 
economic development.   30
As discussed in the previous section, the governance ratings measure governance mandated 
by the state and how a firm goes beyond the requirements of the state. While the ratings measure 
p + q, we would like to isolate q, the firm-level governance. In Panel b of Table 3, we assume that 
p is proxied by the lowest firm score in a country. In other words, we assume that firms with 
higher scores achieved these scores because of firm-level governance. We then introduce a new 
dependent variable, which is based on a difference of scores among firms within a country and 
which we define as (Firm score - Country minimum)/(100 - Country minimum). Multiplied by 
100, this new dependent variable takes values from 0 to 100 like the S&P score itself. It is useful 
to think of this new variable as the firm-level governance score. It will depend on country 
characteristics, since the benefit from improving governance at the firm level depends on country 
characteristics. When we regress the  firm-level governance difference score on firm 
characteristics, we find that these characteristics explain much more of the variation of the score 
in developed countries than in less developed countries. However, country dummies explain more 
of the variation of the difference score than firm characteristics irrespective of the level of 
development. Finally, we also see that adding firm-level characteristics to the regression with 
country dummy variables increases R
2 much more for more developed countries than for the 
other countries. The F-statistics for the significance of firm characteristics are always significant 
for highly developed countries (14.82 in model (1), 20.18 in model (3), and 9.63 in model (5)), 
but only marginally so in model (8) and not at all in models (6) and (10) for less developed 
countries. 
In Table 4, we split the S&P sample using the legal index in which high (low) investor-
protection countries are those with Legal scores above (below) the median. The firm-specific 
variables are jointly significant relative to country factors and even country dummies for not only 
firms in high investor-protection countries but also those in low investor-protection countries. 
The results do not draw the same sharp distinction as with GNP per capita in Table 3. One issue is 
that, whereas GNP per capita works well at separating the sample of countries into two very   31
distinct groups of countries, the same cannot be said for the Legal variable. GNP per capita and 
Legal have a correlation of 0.52. However, Legal takes low values for countries that have a low 
anti-director index. For instance, Argentina and Malaysia have an above-median Legal index in 
contrast to the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, but Argentina and Malaysia have a 
below-median GNP per capita, in contrast to these European countries. 
In our regression analysis, we focus on an index of the legal system (Legal), a measure of 
economic development (GNP per capita), and a measure of financial development (Stock market 
cap per GDP) as the country-specific explanatory variables. One might argue that other country 
variables should affect firm governance. Most importantly, the extent to which property rights are 
enforced is important. Recent research (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003) shows that the respect 
of property rights is an important determinant of economic growth.  In the model of Section 2, 
poor respect of property rights would make it less valuable to invest in governance since 
controlling shareholders who are more likely to be expropriated by the state gain less from 
investing in corporate governance. However, respect of property rights is strongly correlated with 
GNP per capita, so that our specifications might already account for the effect of this property-
rights variable. Nevertheless, we re-estimated our regressions with country characteristics with an 
additional variable that captures respect of property rights. This variable is the risk of 
expropriation index used by LLSV (1998). This index takes values from one through 10, where a 
value of one indicates the highest risk of expropriation. Using this variable restricts our sample 
size because it is not available for China or any of the former Eastern bloc countries. For the 
regressions in Table 2 that have both country and firm characteristics, we find that the coefficient 
on the expropriation index is not significant in the regression for the CLSA ratings, but it is 
positive and highly significant in the regression for the S&P ratings. For the S&P ratings, 
governance is inversely related to the expropriation index, so that countries with a higher risk of 
expropriation have worse governance as we would expect. Consequently, the risk of 
expropriation from the state is an important country characteristic. However, taking that   32
characteristic into account changes none of our basic inferences, although it increases the 
proportion of the cross-sectional variation in governance ratings that can be explained by country 
characteristics. 
We have found evidence that is supportive of our hypotheses. At the same time, however, 
there are important limitations to our approach. One such limitation is that we risk 
underestimating the role of firm characteristics by virtue of our regression analysis. We know we 
fully account for country characteristics whose impact is unrelated to firm characteristics through 
the dummy variables, yet it could be that what we do not explain is simply related to firm 
characteristics we do not observe. If this is the case for the S&P ratings, this would likely not 
overturn our conclusions because country characteristics alone explain 73% of the variation in the 
ratings. Since the country dummy variables explain only 38% of the variation of the CLSA 
ratings, it is possible that firm characteristics we are omitting from the analysis somehow explain 
more of the dispersion in the ratings than country dummy variables themselves. Part of the 
problem here could be mechanical, however. The CLSA rating countries have much less variation 
in country characteristics than those for the S&P ratings because there are simply fewer countries 
represented in that sample. If we had a rating for just one country after all, it would not be 
surprising that all of the variation in those ratings were found to be explained by firm 
characteristics. This is precisely why we have focused more on the S&P ratings. 
We have restricted our focus on those firm characteristics that have been used most often in 
the literature. We investigated whether other characteristics used would help explain the ratings 
better and have not had success. To address the concern about omitted firm characteristics, we 
collected Worldscope data on ten additional firm characteristics (profitability, turnover, and 
leverage measures) and incorporated them into the existing regression specifications, not 
worrying about multicollinearity since the focus is on overall explanatory power. By doing this, 
we increase the adjusted R
2 of model (1) in Table 3 from 17.74% to 21.74%, but the adjusted R
2 
of model (6) increases only from 1.74% to 2.77%, so that for less-developed countries, firm   33
characteristics have trivial explanatory power even when we use the largest specification possible. 
We estimated these regressions using three-year averages for firm characteristics, but the results 
were similar. Since the S&P ratings are determined by objective criteria, it cannot be that the 
analysts who prepared the ratings used information about firms that was not available to investors 
in general. 
So, what would help explain more of the variation in the ratings? Two explanations are 
consistent with noise being the explanation. First, it could be that there is simply random 
variation in governance ratings. Suppose there are governance attributes that are cheap to adopt 
but also have little impact. Some firms might adopt them, others not. Such attributes would be 
economically unimportant, but they would drive down the R
2 of our regressions. Second, there 
could be systematic and idiosyncratic mistakes in the ratings.  
Could there be more at work in these ratings than noise? The limitations of our database 
suggest that it ought to be so. With the rating, we do not know when a firm adopted a particular 
provision. It might have done so in response to a change in some firm characteristic or the market 
environment, but since then this change may have disappeared. Governance provisions are sticky, 
so that even though firm characteristics changed, the provision might have remained in effect. 
Unfortunately, there is nothing that we can do to deal with that issue. However, it suggests that 
the time-series path of firm characteristics likely matters. Further, a firm might have adopted 
governance provisions in response to specific attributes that we (and other researchers) have not 
observed. 
 
5. Does financial globalization reduce the importance of country characteristics? 
Our model predicts that country characteristics should be less important for firms that access 
the global markets. To examine this issue, we re-estimate the regressions of Table 3 that use the 
S&P ratings, but now we split each subsample further into two groups, namely firms with a Level 
2 or 3 ADR (which we call “global firms”) and other firms (“non-global firms”). We expect from   34
our theory that firm characteristics should be more relevant in explaining the S&P rating for firms 
in highly developed countries and for global firms in less developed countries. We also expect 
that country characteristics should be less relevant for these firms. Panel a of Table 5 shows 
estimates for the regressions for firms in highly developed countries. For global firms, the F-
statistic for the joint test that firm characteristics are irrelevant always rejects the null (3.24 for 
model (3) and 8.86 for model (5)). For non-global firms, the F-statistic for firm characteristics is 
insignificant in the regression specification that has no other variables but firm characteristics. 
However, when we add country characteristics or just country dummies, firm characteristics 
become significant explanatory variables (F-statistic of 4.18 in model (8) and 3.10 in model (10)). 
Two results are not supportive of our model, however. Country characteristics are significant for 
global firms as well as for non-global firms and explain more of the cross-sectional variation in 
governance ratings for global firms; firm characteristics increase the adjusted R-squared when 
added to country dummy variables as much for non-global firms as they do for global firms.  
In panel b, we turn to firms in less developed countries. The F-statistic for firm characteristics 
is always significant for global firms (2.53 in model (3) and 3.73 in model (5)). At the same time, 
however, adding firm characteristics to the country dummy variables does not improve the overall 
explanatory power of the regression, as the adjusted R
2 declines from 0.4352 to 0.4301. When we 
consider non-global firms, the F-statistic for firm characteristics is always insignificant (1.13 in 
model (8) and 0.72 in model (10)). We also split the sample of CLSA firms in less developed 
countries into global and non-global firms and these results are presented in panel c. We have 
proportionally fewer “global” firms that have Level 2 or 3 ADRs in the CLSA sample. 
Nevertheless, we find that when controlling for the country characteristics used in the literature, 
firm characteristics are insignificant for non-global firms and significant for global firms. The 
result has to be treated with caution, though, because it does not hold when country 
characteristics are controlled for with dummy variables.   35
Our theory also implies that home-country investor protection should be less important for 
global firms. The evidence supportive of this prediction is limited for the S&P sample. For firms 
from highly developed countries, we find that Legal is significant for firms that are not global, but 
it is not for global firms. For less developed countries, Legal is negative and significant both for 
global firms and non-global firms for the S&P sample. It is insignificant for global firms for the 
CLSA sample and positive and significant for the non-global firms in that sample. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we distinguish between the investor protection granted by the state and investor 
protection adopted by the firm. We show that the extent to which firms choose to improve upon 
the investor protection granted by the state depends on the costs and benefits of doing so. In 
countries with weak development, it is costly to improve investor protection because the 
institutional infrastructure is lacking and good governance has political costs. Further, in such 
countries, the benefit from improving governance is weaker because capital markets lack depth. 
However, financial globalization reduces the importance of country characteristics, thereby 
increasing the incentives for good governance.  
Using the CLSA corporate governance ratings and the S&P transparency and disclosure 
ratings, we find that a large fraction of the variation in these ratings that can be explained is 
attributable to country characteristics. Firm characteristics explain more of the cross-sectional 
variation in corporate governance in more developed countries and country characteristics matter 
less for firms that have access to global markets. A possible explanation for these results is that 
the ratings are better at evaluating firm-level governance in more developed countries or for more 
global firms. This would be more surprising for the S&P ratings than for the CLSA ratings 
because the CLSA ratings have more of a subjective element. It could also be that firm 
characteristics are measured more accurately in more developed countries. Finally, though we use 
firm characteristics that the literature has believed to be associated with governance, it might be   36
that omitted firm characteristics or past values of firm characteristics play a more significant role 
in explaining the ratings. Nevertheless, we believe that the evidence presented here is consistent 
with the view that, while the investor protection granted by the state is an important determinant 
of corporate governance, so are the levels of economic and financial development as well as the 
openness of a country. 
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 Table 2. The importance of country vs. firm characteristics. 
The dependent variable in each regression is either the CLSA corporate governance rating (Panel a) or the 
S&P transparency and disclosure rating (Panel b). Firm-level data is from Worldscope. Sales growth is 
inflation adjusted two-year sales growth from 1998 – 2000 (winsorized at 1% and 99% tails). Ownership, 
Total assets (US$ millions) and Cash/Assets are for 2000. Data for Dependence on external finance, 
computed as capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures, is from 
Computstat from 1995-2000. Legal is Anti-director * Rule of law, which are from LLSV (1998). Log of 
GNP per capita (U$) is for 2000 and is from the World Bank WDI Database. Stock market capitalization to 
GDP is from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2001). The standard errors are computed assuming 
observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. t-statistics are in parentheses. The 
F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the firm-level variables (country) are jointly equal to zero. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. CLSA governance rating. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Sales  growth  5.44  4.92  1.86 
 (2.74)
**  (2.16)
**   (1.13) 
Dependence on external finance  1.49    1.56    0.07 
  (1.51)  (1.57)  (0.09) 
Ownership  -0.76  1.04  2.40 
  -(0.15)  (0.24)  (0.69) 
Log(Assets)  -0.23  -0.99  -1.08 
  -(0.30)  -(1.40)  -(1.43) 
Cash/Assets  16.29   8.13   11.51 
 (3.30)
***   (1.72)
*  (2.15)
** 
Legal   0.51  0.47     
   (2.34)
** (2.26)
**    
Log GNP / capita    1.25  1.65     
   (0.93)  (1.18)     
Stock market capitalization / GDP    -1.11  -1.21     
   -(0.40)  -(0.49)    
Country  dummies  no no no yes  yes 




F-statistic: country-level variables    5.86
*** 6.66
 ***    
Adjusted R
2  0.0424 0.1474 0.1818 0.3860 0.4074 
# of observations  309  309  309  309  309 Table 2, continued. 
  Panel b. S&P transparency and disclosure rating. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant  23.71 5.56  7.52 30.64  16.37 
  (2.33)
** (0.54)  (0.77) (5.18)
*** (3.88)
*** 
Sales growth  -4.20  -2.68  0.29 
  -(0.67)  -(0.44)  (0.19) 





Ownership  -16.69   -7.09    1.20 
  -(1.68)  -(1.09)  (0.49) 





Cash/Assets  10.53   3.70  4.13 
  (2.71)
**   (1.06)  (1.43) 
Legal   0.23  0.24    
   (1.22)  (1.42)    
Log GNP / capita   3.80  1.35    
   (2.76)
*** (1.00)     
Stock market capitalization / GDP   4.97  5.37    
   (1.24)  (1.41)    
Country dummies  no no no yes  yes 




F-statistic: country-level variables   9.05
*** 4.60
***    
Adjusted R
2  0.2249 0.2996 0.3515 0.7338 0.7515 
# of observations  667 667 667 667 667 T
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